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Abstract.  The paper, first, summarizes Latin American structuralism, and offers 
reasons why it was so influential and durable in the region, as it attended to real 
demands, and was part of 1950s’mainstream economics. Second, says why, with 
1980s’Great Crisis, structuralism eventually ended itself into crisis, as it was unable to 
keep pace with historical new facts, particularly with the industrial revolution or take-
off, that made Latin American economies intermediary, still developing, but fully 
capitalist. Third, it lists the consensus that today exists on economic development. 
Forth, opposes “official orthodoxy” to “developmental populism”, the former deriving 
from neoclassical economics, the later from structuralism, and offers, in relation to six 
strategic issues, a progressive development alternative. 
In the 1940s and 1950s, following the Great Depression, the moderate left in 
Latin America disposed of a consistent economic doctrine to chart economic 
development, and the moderate right, none. As a kind of trade-off, from mid 1980s to 
mid 1990s, the right counted with an apparently coherent proposal of economic 
reform, based on neoclassical economics, while the left was in disarray and the 
structuralist doctrine was transformed into developmental populism. Yet, while 
academic neoclassical doctrine was itself reduced to the Washington Consensus and 
what I will call “official orthodoxy”, a segment of the new left, or the social-liberal 
left, asserts since mid 1980s that there is a progressive alternative, first, to recover  2
stabilization, and, second, to resume economic growth.
1
 Which development 
alternative is that? Does it combine a commitment to the poor with the logic of a 
global market? Will it be really able to promote economic growth with increasing 
social justice? How can it be compared with the structuralist and the orthodox 
doctrine? In this paper I will try to provide some answers for these questions. 
Any development strategy is supposed to take into account economic 
constraints. Yet, if they are imposing, this does not mean that there is no room for 
creative and progressive policymaking, as the globalist doctrine asserts.
2
 But it also 
does not legitimize the opposite view: advocating a specific economic theory to deal 
with developing countries’ economic specificities, as the structuralist doctrine once 
claimed. Against the orthodox “no-alternative” claim there is a more relevant 
argument. Economic policies have necessarily distributive implications. Thus interests 
and the correspondent ideological currents have a major play in defining policies, that 
cannot, logically, be reduced to only one set of “rational” policies. Class interests, 
group interests, and national interests obviously affect policymaking. If they did not, 
victory or defeat in elections of a left and a right-wing political coalition would not 
have any economic consequence – what is just nonsense. 
Besides national specificities, that are losing importance, and interests, that 
remain decisive, it is important to consider a third factor: competence in assessing 
economic problems and in taking policy decisions. Economic policies can be 
extremely incompetent in moments in which interests are neutralized and the 
policymaker is free to decide which is the best route to follow. If, after that, outcomes 
are negative, this is a signal that the wrong alternatives were adopted, out of 
incompetence or ignorance.  
Thus, mistaken policy making does not have only origin in economic populism, 
as orthodox conventional wisdom claims. Nor have origin in the interests of rich 
countries, or of the local capitalist class, as left-wing conventional wisdom asserts. 
Populist economic policies from the left and the right are indeed a major source of 
mistakes, and orthodox doctrine’s conservative bias is undeniable, but mistaken 
policymaking also originates in ignorance of policymakers, or in emotional factors 
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 - Many authors used to distinguish economic development from economic growth, and 
development economics from growth economics. I believe that today makes more sense to 
use both expressions interchangeably. Distinguishing them makes thins rather more confusing 
than more simple. The reason for that view will become clearer while I develop my argument 
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relevant. 
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there is no other alternative than to follow orthodox prescriptions. For a critique of this view 
see Wade (1996).  3
widespread among the local technocrats that take responsibility of economic 
policymaking: as arrogance and fear. And it also originates from the perverse refusal 
of adopting the policies that derive or would derive of local policymakers own 
assessment if they decided to think on their own, rather than preferring the “confidence 
building strategy”: to adopt the policies positively viewed by economists in 
Washington and in the international financial institutions. 
Economic theories and economic policies have always been imported and 
continue to be imported by Latin America. Most of what was imported was good, but, 
since most of the time imports were made non-critically, they also turn into a major 
source of mistakes. One should expect that the economic growth that took place in 
these countries in the twentieth century, and the development of graduate programs in 
economics in Latin American universities would have had as consequence an 
increased capacity of analyzing economic problems, and in defining more 
autonomously the required economic policies. The first assumption is right, the 
second, wrong. Why? In part because while neoclassical doctrine defeated the 
Keynesian opponents in the rich countries and continued to develop, recovering its 
mainstream capacity, structuralist doctrine fell into a severe crisis with the exhaustion 
of the Latin American import substitution strategy. In part because, since the 1970s 
imports of ideas found a new medium: young economists making their PhD principally 
in the United States. They turned back controlling more skillfully economic theory and 
econometric tools, but, in general, their critical capacity rather decreased than 
increased, when compared with the correspondent ability among economists formed in 
the Latin American universities.
3
 
In this paper I will deal more specifically with development economics and 
with the policies oriented to promote economic growth. My focus will be in the 
developing countries, or in the intermediary economies, that should clearly be 
distinguished from the poor or underdeveloped economies, where primitive 
accumulation and the take-off did not yet occur.
4
 Thus, I am roughly classifying 
countries in three categories: developed, intermediary, and underdeveloped or poor. 
This is a classification where participation in categories is permanently changing. Most 
Latin American countries, that were underdeveloped in the first part of the twentieth 
century, are now intermediary economies.  
In the first session I will discuss the lost Latin American consensus on the 
structuralist doctrine. Why the structuralist ideas of the 50s and 60s achieved the 
dominance they did, how original they were, how they participated from mainstream 
economics at that moment, and also, why the new historical facts that they were not 
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 - There is, obviously, many exceptions, that derive rather from the fact that foreign 
universities are often able to recruit our brightest young economists, than from the “superior 
knowledge” they would obtain abroad. 
4
 - Ahead I will discuss these concepts (“primitive accumulation”, “take-off”).   4
able to tackle led them to a deep crisis and to their degradation to developmental 
populism. In the second session, we will see how the structuralist development 
economics came under attach of international economists, while a new neoclassical 
growth theory ignored old-push and structuralist approaches, and developed new 
theories following two different but complementary routes: one defining market 
failures deriving from externalities, asymmetry of information, learning by doing, 
increasing returns, that justify some state intervention; the other underlining the 
positive role of state institutions that guarantee property rights and contracts in making 
markets work well independently of government policymaking. In the third, I will 
shortly review the consensus or quasi-consensus that already exist on development 
economics. In the final session, taking for grant the quasi-consensus, I will offer an 
progressive alternative to official orthodoxy and developmental populism in some 
strategic issues: reforms, balance of payments stabilization, development finance, 
trade, and distribution of income. Official orthodoxy and developmental populism are 
simplifications and radicalizations, one of neoclassical economics, the other of 
classical and Keynesian economics, the later usually invoking spuriously Keynes 
thought.
5
 Although orthodox and developmental doctrines will be here presented in 
simplified way, I hope not to transform them into scarecrows, but to criticize them in a 
way that makes the progressive alternative meaningful. 
The Lost Consensus: The Structuralist Approach 
Between the 1950s and the 1970s there was a broad consensus in Latin America 
about the development strategy to be followed, the “developmental strategy”, based in 
the Latin American structuralist development economics, or, for short, structuralist 
doctrine. Its founding father was Raul Prebisch, and the initial document, the 
introduction he wrote for ECLA’s 1948 Latin American Survey, published in 1949.
6
   
The large and long influence the structuralist doctrine had in Latin American 
may be explained with three arguments. First, it was a theoretically well-founded 
doctrine. Second, it was consistent with mainstream development economics. Third, it 
was a doctrine that responded to the existing demands and trends in the economies of 
the major Latin American countries, which were engaged in import substitution 
industrialization since the 1930s. I will shortly present these three factors, and, in the 
end of the section, I will show how, as time elapsed and historical conditions changed, 
while the theory did not changed accordingly, it got distorted by populist epigones. 
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 - For a defense of Keynes against populists see Bresser-Pereira and Dall’ Acqua (1991). 
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Structuralist doctrine was based on an original critique of classical comparative 
advantage theory’s non-predicted consequences. “Prebisch’s thesis”, as it came to be 
known, said that there was a major distortion in free international markets, that 
comparative advantages did not take into account: the tendency to the deterioration of 
terms of trade for primary products’ exporters. This trend was the outcome of the 
capacity that manufacturing workers in the developed countries had of transforming 
productivity gains in wage increases due to their organization in unions, while workers 
in developing countries, working mostly in agriculture, were not able to do the same in 
relation to productivity increases in their countries. This thesis was grossly confirmed 
by an obvious fact: developed countries were industrial countries; developing 
countries, primary goods exporters. The specific historical confirmation of the 
deterioration of terms of trade was not so clear, and several studies tried to challenge 
it, but, the “best” outcome orthodox economists were able to pull off against 
Prebisch’s thesis was that terms of trade among developed and developing countries 
would have been constant in the long run. Or, this was a confirmation of Prebisch’s 
argument: given that productivity increases have been historically higher in 
manufacturing when compared with primary industries, comparative advantages 
theory would predict that terms of trade should improve for the primary goods 
exporters. As they did not, Prebisch’s argument, that later Emmanuel translated to 
Marxist terms and named it the unequal exchange theory, was validated.
7
 
Specialization in low value added primary goods involved a transfer of value from 
poor agricultural and mining countries to industrial ones. The argument in favor of 
industrialization was strong. Prebisch did not deny comparative advantages theory and 
the potential gains deriving from free trade. The argument, combined with the infant 
industry one, was an argument in favor of temporary protection for getting 
industrialization started.  
From this critique, structuralist doctrine was able to derive its two major 
development policies: industrialization, which was made synonymous of economic 
growth, and state intervention to achieve it.
8
 And two specific strategies putting 
together the two ideas: protection of the new manufacturing industries – the import 
substitution strategy –, and creation of state-owned enterprises when the local 
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To legitimize this development strategy structuralist doctrine looked for support 
from the new development economics that was being developed in the advanced 
countries, particularly in Britain, since the 1940s, and that may be called pioneers’ or 
big-push development economics. Raúl Prebisch was, since the beginning, part of the 
group of economists that came to be called “pioneers of development”
10
 The Prebisch 
thesis is often also referred as the Prebisch-Singer thesis, to acknowledge Hans 
Singer’s contribution to the theme.
11
 Classical economists had been essentially 
development economists. The major contributions to development economics are still 
the ones of Smith, Ricardo, and Marx. After the neoclassical revolution, the major 
contribution came from Schumpeter, but his 1911 book, which significantly started by 
criticizing the neoclassical circular flow, remained for many years an isolated incident. 
The paper that reestablished development economics as a legitimate and major branch 
in economic theory was Rosenstein-Rodan’s paper on the big-push hypothesis, 
"Problems of Industrialization in Eastern Europe and South-Eastern Europe".
12
 As all 
relevant contributions to the field, it started with a critique of neoclassical general 
equilibrium assumption that free markets will automatically promote growth, using the 
concept of positive (pecuniary) externalities to legitimize state intervention – 
specifically the “big push” idea. This article was followed by a series of major 
contributions by Nurkse, Lewis, Leibenstein, Myrdall, Perroux, Furtado, Hirschman, 
Chenery, Streeten, and others. The development economics they initiated was, at that 
time, part of mainstream economics. It represented, in development economics, what 
Keynes represented in macroeconomics: a rupture with orthodox economics. 
Orthodoxy, specifically in the Walrasian form, with constant returns of scale, no 
learning by doing, perfect information, insignificant transaction costs and externalities, 
although essential to figure out how works a market economy, particularly how it 
efficiently allocates resources, it was of little help in understanding underdevelopment 
and the policies to overcome it, as it was of limited usefulness to comprehend and 
tackle the macroeconomic business cycle. Since the Great Depression neoclassical 
views were in the defensive, while Keynesian macroeconomics and big push 
development economics were in the offensive from the 1930s till the 1960s. The 
structuralist Latin American development economics was part of this movement. It 
was a branch of the big-push theories, to which it was added a Marxist pitch for the 
long run, and a Keynesian one for short-run macroeconomics. 
Third, structuralist doctrine was so influential in Latin America because it 
responded to the demands and justified trends already present in the major Latin 
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American economies. Since the early 1930s Latin American countries were in various 
degrees involved in industrialization, which, in some cases, corresponded to a real 
take-off in Rostow’s terms. Besides, the industrialization was of the import 
substitution kind. The Latin American economies profited from the natural protection 
that was caused, first, by the fall in commodities’ prices due to the Great Depression, 
and, second, by World War II. And, in the case of Brazil, it additionally profited from 
the Keynesian before Keynes economic policies adopted by government to protect the 
export sector, which eventually sustained aggregate demand.
13
 Finally, in some 
countries the new manufactures were being complemented or supported by substantial 
investments in the basic industries by new state-owned enterprises. Thus, when, in the 
late 1940s and in the 1950s, structuralist economists proposed the import substitution 
strategy of industrialization, and an active role for the state, they were just legitimizing 
a successful economic process. On the other hand, when they criticized orthodox 
doctrine for its radical laissez-faire bias, and spoke for a more balanced view, i.e., for 
mixed economies, they were just putting in words what was being done in the 
advanced capitalist economies. 
These three factors explain why structuralist development economics was so 
influential in Latin America, but they are not a sufficient account of why it remained 
dominant in the region for so long, till late 1980s, and ended in such a distorted way. 
This was the outcome of the populist conversion that structuralist doctrine underwent 
under politicians and incompetent second hand disseminators. 
Three major distortions marked structuralist thought. First, protectionism turned 
into a long-term strategy, instead of being a provisional policy for the take-off. Since 
the 1960s the infant industry argument had lost explicative power, but continued to be 
used to justify import substitution strategy, leading to inefficiency and rent-seeking. It 
lost ground in the academic and in the policy realms because manufacturing in Latin 
America was turning mature, and due to a theoretical argument: the “principle of 
targeting” developed by Bhagwati (1971), which justified economic policy to be 
interventionist at domestic level, while, at the same time, adopting a free trade 
strategy.
14
 Second, the deterioration of terms of trade argument, that was a good 
argument to legitimate state intervention to promote industrialization, did not hold up 
export pessimism, nor contradicted the potential advantages of free trade.
15
  Third, 
waving the banner of Keynes’ effective demand, a classical sub-consumption theory, 
that had little to do with Keynesian macroeconomics, was adopted in order to justify 
chronic budget deficits, that ultimately gave rise to a fiscal crisis of the state in the 
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early 1980s.
16
 Forth, a strange “economics without prices” (as strange as the opposite 
neo-liberal “economics without government policies”), instead of viewing deviations 
from market resource allocation as relevant exceptions, understood them as 
justification for generalized state intervention. 
Another way of explaining structuralist development economics’ crisis is to say 
that the most of us have been unable to understand the new historical facts and 
accordingly develop new theories. The “new dependency theory”, whose classical 
contributions remains Cardoso and Faletto’s 1969 book, was an attempt in this 
direction, as it recognized new historical facts that required new policies – particularly 
the consolidation of the industrialization in the region with the active participation of 
multinational enterprises, that contradicted the structuralist assumption that central 
(imperialist) countries would represent an obstacle to the periphery’s 
industrialization.
17
 Yet, in the 1970s we were too much concerned with fighting the 
authoritarian regimes in the region, and with criticize the income concentration 
consequences of the prevailing “capitalist-technobureaucratic development model”, 
and in the 1980s we have been constrained to focus our attention in stabilization 
policies, so that the required renovation of structuralist development economics did not 
occur.
18
 It became prisoner, as Hirschman observed, of “a construct, the ‘typical 




It is noteworthy, however, to underline that the fatal disease, that lead Latin 
America to the 1980s’ Great Crisis and eventually to the fall down of the structuralist 
doctrine, was originated in the perverse marriage of the dual gap theory, that viewed 
foreign exchange as the dominant constraint developing countries faced, with 
mainstream economic orthodoxy, that legitimated high foreign indebtedness in the 
1970s. The dual gap theory was in the core of the structuralist approach, as it 
emphasized the relative income-inelasticity of imports of primary goods by developed 
countries, contrasted with the relative income-elasticity of imports of manufactured 
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goods by developing countries. Thus, besides a domestic savings gap, there was a 
structural foreign exchange gap, that up to early 1970s, constrained economic 
development in Latin America. The export pessimism behind the dual gap theory, and 
the orthodox belief that markets rationally allocate borrowed resources were the two 




Summing up, the conditions that justified a protectionist import substitution 
strategy were not anymore present since the 1960s. On the other hand, if judicious 
state intervention remains necessary, the times of big-push and state-led 
industrialization were for long definitely over. Third, export pessimism proved wrong 
in all cases that countries got really committed to export-led growth. Yet, a 
deteriorated structuralist doctrine, turned into a mere developmental ideology, mixing 
up economic populism, old nationalism, and sheer economic incompetence, was 
unable to recognize these new historical facts, to develop new analysis, and to propose 
new policies. In the late 1980s a major policy change takes place, and necessary short-
term fiscal adjustment and medium term market-oriented reforms are adopted. But, 
probably because developmental populism survived for so long, when it was 
abandoned, change involved excess: a 180 degrees turn that implied in new and 
serious economic distortions, and in major potential output losses.  
Attack or Oblivion 
The 1980s’ Great Latin American Crisis made the neo-liberal wave stronger in 
the region than in any other part of the world, while accelerated structuralist 
development economics’ collapse. Yet, before that structuralism and more generally 
big-push development economics were already under attack by some, while ignored by 
others. The attack came from the international economists, led by Bella Balassa, 
Jagdish Bhagwati, and Anne Krueger, that advocate trade liberalization and export 
orientation. In spite the strong ideological element involved in the debate, the 
arguments presented by this group of economists proved persuasive, and, by late 
1970s, it is reasonable to say that they had won the debate.
21
  
Ignorance or oblivion had a different source: the advent of a new neoclassical 
research program based in the mid 1950s Solow’s model of economic growth. Based 
in the model and in the empirical analysis that the Cobb-Douglas function allowed, 
Solow, Denison, and Abramovitz disturbed, in a first moment, the belief that capital 
accumulation played a major role in economic development. Instead, what would 
explain economic growth was technological progress, which could be deduced from 
                                              
20
 - I will return to this issue in the last session of this paper. 
21
 - For a remarkable although biased account of this change see Little (1982).  10
the large exogenous residuum (around 75 percent) left by the regression exercises.
22
 
From this moment on, neoclassical economics finally counted with a growth model 
that was consistent with the general equilibrium approach, but that had a paradoxical 
implication: savings and investment did not matter. In consequence, “most of the 
subsequent research effort in this field of growth was designed to reverse this 
conclusion, or rather to ‘assign back’ to the factors of production sources of growth”.
23
  
Obviously technical progress, although increasingly autonomous, was not at 
that time independent from capital accumulation, and still today it is not. On the other 
hand, there was a large room for research trying to disaggregate a too big residuum. 
Since Solow model was based in a simple mathematical tool – a production function – 
economists felt stimulated to engage into an endless game of defining “growth 
models” involving small changes in the basic model, and submitting the new model to 
statistical test. Thus, almost in a reflex way, these economists forgot that the discipline 
was born to study growth in the poor and intermediary countries, and to show how 
these economies would converge for the levels of the developed ones, and changed 
most their attention to the development of the developed economies. The new 
“endogenous models of growth”, that appeared in the 1980s, were just an additional 
sophistication to this kind of formal modeling and empirical research.
24
 As it had 
happened with the Keynesian Harrod-Domar model, that was the first formal model of 
growth to appear, the neoclassical formal models added little to what we already knew 
about the process of economic development.
25
 More relevant to economic 
development theory – a major substantive contribution – was the human capital theory 
developed in the early 1960s by Schultz.
26
  
Yet, mainstream development economics continue to progress. I may detect 
five major areas or currents: the growth models doctrine, that converged to the 
endogenous growth models; the international economics theories, that fought for free 
trade and export-oriented strategies; the New Keynesian and New Structuralist 
contributions, that concentrated its attention in market failures that legitimize state 
intervention;
27
 the New Institutional Economics, that explained development by good 
institutions, particularly by institutions guaranteeing property rights and low 
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transaction costs, so that markets could well work;
28
 and the Evolutionary 
Development Economics, inspired in Schumpeter’s innovation theory.
29
  
In the advanced countries, theoretical and empirical progress after the human 
capital theory was modest, although models and econometric tests were not in short 
supply. Most of the models were ideologically constrained, either, on one side, saying 
that reforms building good institutions will guarantee economic systems’ market 
coordination and will reduce rent-seeking and moral hazard, or, on the other, 
underlining market failures, asymmetry of information, externalities, learning by 
doing, increasing returns, positive and negative externalities or spillovers. While 
development economics continued to be thrive in the advanced countries, economists 
in Latin America, since the 1980s, had little alternative but to leave it in second place: 
they are relatively few and had to concentrate their attention in macroeconomic 
stabilization, and in market-oriented reforms.  
The Present Quasi-consensuses 
Economic theory is made of consensus and debate. After the crisis and renewal 
of development economics, and specifically of the structuralist approach – where crisis 
was more salient than renewal – I believe that today some consensus or quasi-
consensus already exist on what depends growth. Most of the ideas come from 
classical theory, some are more recent, but none have its validity depending on 
theoretical and ideological assumptions behind classical, Marxist, or neoclassical 
economics – they rather depend on the sensible economic thinking that is common to 
all these schools of economic thought, and on the empirical research and the historical 
observation done. 
First, we know for long that economic development depends on savings and 
capital accumulation. Second, that knowledge, or technical progress, embodied in 
capital accumulation, or disembodied, is increasingly important. Third, that education, 
or, more broadly, human capital, plays a major role in the game. Fourth, that the 
entrepreneurial drive to innovate is essential. Fifth, that the creation of “positive” 
institutions guaranteeing property rights and free markets are as important as changing 
“negative” institutions that, particularly in the initial phases, are obstacles to 
innovation and efficient resource allocation. Sixth, that in the initial stages of 
economic development the state plays a direct major role in promoting primitive 
accumulation and the take-off. Seventh, that market failures and state failures speak 
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for mixed economies, never for just market controlled, nor for fully state coordinated 
economies. 
I include among the consensual knowledge on economic development this last 
one although knowing that the debate between market and state will probably continue 
for long, because the real question is only a question of grade, not of essence. 
Adopting a case by case method, we will see that specific circumstances will justify 
intervention in resource allocation, while better income distribution will require 
systematic state action. Developing countries have no reason for abstaining to practice 
an active trade policy that, although free trade oriented, implies a continuous effort to 
gain foreign markets, benefiting national business enterprises having potential 
international competitiveness with technological incentives, preferences in state 
purchasing, and even temporary subsidies.  
Besides these seven stances, Latin American economists learned some lessons 
with the 1980s’Great Crisis that led to new consensuses or quasi-consensuses. I would 
emphasize two. First, that there is no economic development without macroeconomic 
stability. Populist cycles were so harmful in the past, that turned unthinkable repeating 
Peron’s or Alan Garcia’s experiences – probably the most paradigmatic episodes of 
economic populism.
30
 Yet, this does not mean that economic populism is dead. It is 
only more moderate, subtler. Neo-populism overvalues the currency, controls 
inflation, and raises real salaries and consumption, but does not lose control of state’s 
expenditures. In the 1990s this sort of economic policy was a present in the three 
major economies of the region. 
The second consensus is the democratic one. We should know for long, but 
only in the twentieth century a consensus was achieved that democracy is the political 
regime that more effectively assures political order and macroeconomic stability. Or, 
the more stable and predictable the economy and the political system, the higher will 
be the rate of growth. Democracy became the preferred political regime in developed 
countries in the first half of the twentieth century; in Latin America, in last quarter of 
this same century. In the 1940s and 1950s economic development came before 
democracy in the hearts and minds of Latin America structuralist doctrine. Yet, after 
the disaster that military rule represented to the region, democratic governance, since 
the early 1960s, gained a new status. The fact the United States, in the early 1980s, 
stop supporting bureaucratic-capitalist coalitions, was coupled with previous decision 
of the bourgeoisie to sever its political coalition with the military. This change in 
political commitments began already in the second part of the 1970, and allowed me to 
predict the coming transition to democracy.
31
 When authoritarian regimes finally 
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crumble down, Latin American countries obviously did not reach “people’s 
democracy”, which is non-existent even in politically more advanced countries. But as 
capitalism and the appropriation of surplus through the market was now a definitive 
reality, democracy proved to be the political regime that more effectively secures 
order, avoids corruption, improves justice, and favors growth. Democracy is not a 
panacea in relation to any of these objectives, but it is a political regime that does not 
depend on enlightened princes, or on illuminated elites. As it advances, as it is 
advancing in Latin America, “civil society’s democracy” gradually substitutes for 
some kind of “elites’ democracy”: public debate becomes generalized and serious, 
public opinion starts to play a major role, democracy gets increasingly consolidated, 
local and foreign investors feel more secure in investing their money.
32
 
The repetitive character of economic literature may reflect lack of creativity on 
the part of economists, but it is mainly due to the consensuses that have been achieved. 
In development economics I listed nine quasi-consensuses. In the next and last section 
I will discuss which are the strategic issues that need more debate before an eventual 
agreement.  
Strategic Issues 
Debate rather than consensus is the general rule in social sciences and in public 
policy matters, and we should never forget that economics is, before anything, a social 
science. Thus, although I can list some quasi-consensuses, disagreement continues 
high in relation to development policy. Latin American structuralist development 
economics may have come to a crisis, but “official” development strategy, the one 
usually adopted by World Bank and IMF, continues to be under attack coming from 
different sources. Most of this critique is against the standard “policy recipe” 
multilateral institutions use independently of the specific conditions each country 
faces. I fully agree with this type of criticism. As a matter of fact, it makes little sense 
that one or two institutions have so much power over indebted developing countries, 
so that they can impose their views. It is difficult to believe that a few non-accountable 
economists in Washington know better what should be done in each country than the 
local economists. Even when countries are extremely poor, as it is the case of Sub-
Saharan countries, it does not seem that Washington’s conditionality is beneficial. The 
historical outcomes of official loans plus conditionality in this region are terrible. 
                                                                                                                                             
the adhesion of businessmen to the democratic cause, as they did not feel anymore threatened 
by a Castro-type revolution, and, so, did not see reason or advantage in being monitored by 
the military. The only thing published in English in this line is Bresser-Pereira (1984: Chapter 
9). 
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Society’s Democracy in Brazil”.  14
Yet, instead of insisting in this issue, in this last session I will look for a 
progressive, new left alternative between the official development strategy (which 
should not be identified with mainstream neoclassical economics), and the anti-official 
developmental or populist views (which also should not be identified with structuralist 
development economics).
33
 Official and developmental views are often crude practical 
simplification of much more sophisticated theories, but they are politically significant 
as long as public debate is usually referred and economic policies based on these ideas, 
and not directly on the complex and often conflicting theories that academic 
economists develop within each school of thought. 
My question is: which are the strategic questions related to intermediary 
countries’ economic development for which either orthodox or developmental views 
have no satisfactory responses? Which progressive development alternative is required 
on market-oriented reforms? On macroeconomic stabilization? On development 
finance? On trade strategy? On income distribution? On the role of experts or 
bureaucrats? As we will see, in some cases the alternative strategies are, as would be 
predictable, between the two opposite extremes, but in other cases they oppose both 
orthodox and developmental views that, paradoxically, are alike. I was short in listing 
the quasi-consensuses; in discussing issues that require more public debate I will be 
just a little more detailed. 
Reforms 
Developing countries need institutional reform. They need legal and 
organizational institutions that act not as obstacles but as guaranty and incentive of 
work and innovation. This is consensual, what is not consensual is how to do this. The 
official approach evaluates reforms according only to one criterion: increase in 
markets’ role. A more balanced view should recognize the need of market-oriented 
reforms, but since the essential nature of the crisis was a crisis of the state, it 
advocates, as a second criterion, the ability of reforms of strengthening state 
institutions and state organization, of making it more efficient and more effective. The 
first generation of reforms was market-oriented reforms. Trade liberalization was the 
obviously required reform given past protectionism. Privatization was also required, 
given the distortions caused by disproportionate use of state-owned enterprises, but 
privatization of natural monopolies counting on regulatory agencies does not make 
economic sense: it responded to ideological pressures on one side, and to the financial 
crisis of the state on the other. Internal financial reform, making public budgets more 
effective, and central banks more independent, were also badly required, but 
liberalization of international flows is quite another story. They are not an imposition 
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of globalization, as it is often argued, but respond to interests of the international 
financial system in detriment of state capacity and macroeconomic stabilization.
34
  
Within the second generation of reforms, managerial public reform is central. It 
involves distinguishing exclusive state activities from social and scientific activities 
that the state is suppose to finance but not to execute, and making state agencies and 
bureaucrats more autonomous and more accountable. In order to achieve the later goal, 
it is required reducing bureaucratic procedural controls and increasing role of 
contracted objectives’ control, managed internal competition, and social control by 
civil society.  
On this subject we should differentiate a new literature that starts old giving a 
central role to “horizontal accountability”, i.e., to classical checks and balances and 
auditing systems, from the new public management or managerial public 
administration literature. The first continues to identify state reform with civil service 
(bureaucratic) reform, while the second assumes that civil service reform already took 
place, and proposes a next step, managerial reform; or, if civil service reform was not 
completed, asserts that the best way to complete it is managerial reform.
35
  
It is also important to consider the “bureaucratic insulation” proposal that is 
quite usual in the orthodox and developmental agenda. In order to avoid politicians’ 
populist interference, some key state agencies should be insulated from their influence. 
I have no objection to this as long as the insulation is the outcome of the legislative 
branch’ decision. Democratic politicians will tend to do that, even in countries in 
which pork barrel politics continues to exist at national level.
36
 They know that their 
survival in office depends on contradictory demands – on the demand of 
macroeconomic stabilization and transparent policies on one hand, and, on the other, 
on attending their constituencies’ pressures – and they look for some balance between 
them. One form of achieving this balance is protecting some agencies – as central 
banks and regulatory agencies – from day to day politics. What is unacceptable is 
proposing bureaucratic insulation per se. This is just disguised authoritarianism. 
The second generation of reforms includes judicial reform, whose objectives 
are usually making the judiciary branch more independent, having judicial cases more 
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rapidly decided, and rule-of-law, more effective. This is certainly an important reform, 
but Brazilian experience shows that an independent judiciary branch (as this country 
already have) does not mean an effective and efficient one. Second generation reforms 
involve also making labor markets more “flexible”. Indeed, new technologies, 
international competitiveness require more flexible working hours and part time jobs. 
And international competitiveness requires welfare institutions that stimulate work. 
But they do not require a “flexibilization” that just means eliminating social rights. In 
this moment, as well as when natural monopolies are privatized, or when financial 
liberalization involve complete liberalization of financial flows, or when managerial 
reform means erasing civil service and reducing the state to minimum, reforms 
sponsored by official orthodoxy become just a manifestation of a right-wing, neo-
liberal, ideology. 
Stabilization 
I included among the quasi-consensuses macroeconomic stabilization. It is 
essential for economic development. But stabilization is not only price stabilization, 
and balanced budget. Stabilization is also balance of payment equilibrium. According 
to official orthodoxy, it is not necessary to directly worry about current account 
deficits, given that it assumes the twin deficits theory: budget deficits lead to current 
account deficit; thus it is sufficient to fight the first, that the second will be 
automatically warranted. This assumption, that makes orthodox policymakers soft on 
current account deficits – and so, paradoxically friendly with neo-populism – was 
proved wrong in Mexico and in Brazil, and it is for several years being proved wrong 
in Argentina. The damages it caused to the three greatest Latin American economies 
were enormous. If the country does not end in a foreign currency financial crisis, it is 
constrained to systematically reduce its growth rate in order to avoid such crisis. Yet, 
just read the newspapers today about the Argentinean economy and IMF. We only 
read that budget deficit target is or is not being met. As if the fiscal was the only 
problem. As if Argentina did not face a serious balance of payments problem given the 
manifest overvaluation of the peso. The twin deficits theory is “logical” but it is often 
not true. This was already demonstrated in innumerous cases.
37
 Yet, the official 
stabilization doctrine continues to assume the twin deficits theory.  
Finance 
Developmental neo-populism and official orthodoxy are soft on current account 
deficits for different reasons. The former, because it believes in “easy economic 
growth”, ignoring costs or trade-offs, the later for two different and concurrent 
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reasons. First because, according to neoclassical belief, if the budget deficit is under 
control, eventual increase in indebtedness will be private, and private foreign 
indebtedness is no cause for worry: markets will take care of it. This argument does 
not take into consideration that the foreign debt is a national-state’s debt. When a 
country faces a currency crisis, it is because the country as a whole is insolvent, not 
because each individual debtor is in such situation. Second, because official orthodoxy 
is an ideological product of creditor countries, and creditors do not willingly accept 
constraints to the indebtedness of their clients except the limits they themselves pose.  
As a matter of fact, capital is made at home, with its own savings. Feldstein and 
Horioka showed this fact for the developed countries.
38
 Yet, neoclassical economics 
teaches an obvious thing: whenever expected rate of return on investment is higher 
than the interest rate firms (and countries) will be entitled to borrow. Domestically or 
abroad, it is indifferent. From this abstract reasoning, and from the capital shortage 
existing in developing countries, which would leave us to predict a higher rate of 
profit, it is derived a definitive truth, shared by orthodox and developmental 
economists: it is natural and desirable for developing countries to be debtors and 
developed countries to be creditors. 
This logical deductive reasoning ignores how risk is for developing countries to 
finance economic growth with foreign borrowing. The probability that a large part of 
the borrowed resources be used in consumption, and that a populist cycle takes place, 
is enormous. Developing economies are small economies. When borrowed foreign 
currency starts flowing in, the local currency will tend to rise, and the exchange rate to 
turn overvalued. Overvaluation means change in relative prices, means that the prices 
of non-tradable increases in relation to the prices of tradable. The more important non-
tradable is labor, whose price, wages, will increase with evaluation of the local 
currency. Higher wages will mean higher consumption: higher imports, including 
higher tourism abroad. Instead of investing, the country will consume a substantial 
proportion of what it borrowed. Albert Hirschman once observed that it was 
interesting to study Latin America, because it was possible to see there, in a crude 
way, what was disguised in advanced countries.
39
 Today, I suggest that Latin 
Americans should carefully study Sub-Saharan Africa, because there one can see in a 
crude way what is disguised in their region. In 1970 these countries had an income per 
capita around 400 dollars and no debt; today they have the same 400 dollars of per 
capita income, and an enormous per capita debt. In these countries almost 100 percent 
of what was borrowed was spent in consumption (and corruption of a bureaucratic 
oligarchy), in Latin America this figure is certainly smaller. Let us say 50 percent, or 
30 percent. But these percentages are already unacceptable. 
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Against this reasoning and against the fact that foreign borrowing usually ended 
in disaster for Latin America, one can argue that United States’ economic growth in 
the nineteenth century was financed by England. It is true. But in that moment United 
Sates was already a developed country, a dynamic developed country that was 
borrowing from a quasi-stagnant developed country. Developing countries today face 
an entirely different situation. It is a dangerous fantasy to believe that international 
markets and the World Bank will be helpful to developing countries. Foreign 
borrowing should be limited, and foreign direct investment, in principle, preferred to 
borrowing. 
Free Trade 
Free trade made enormous advances in the last twenty years. Besides the 
Uruguay Round and the creation of WTO, many developing countries engaged in 
unilateral trade liberalizations. Yet, although official orthodoxy is formally in favor, 
and developmental doctrine against trade liberalization, conventional wisdom shared 
by both approaches is that developed countries support free trade while developing 
countries resist to it. I speak of “conventional wisdom” because, if it is true that 
intermediary countries continue to resist trade liberalization, the countries that more 
strongly resist are the developed ones. 
There was a complete inversion of national interests in relation to international 
trade. If in the 1950s protection was more on the interest of developing than of 
developed countries, the inverse is true today. Domestic producers everywhere fear 
free trade while they insecure on the competitive capacity. Yet, if intermediary 
countries fear free trade, developed countries fear much more. In manufactured 
products whose technology is relatively simple, intermediary countries use the same 
technology used by developed, and incur in smaller labor costs. Even when technology 
becomes moderately sophisticated, but remains labor-intensive, intermediary 
countries’ competitive advantage is significant. Most intermediary countries did not 
realize that for long, some still do not, while developed countries know this very well 
since the 1970s. They adopt free trade rhetoric but their practice is mostly 
protectionist. 
Income Distribution 
Here also there was a full inversion, but only within intermediary countries, not 
in their relations with developed countries. If in the 1950s, when these countries were 
beginning industrialization, concentration of income was part of the game, today it is 
not anymore. On the contrary, an increasing number of studies show that the more 
even the distribution, the more dynamic will be the economy. It is true that the 
connection between inequality and development run in both causal directions. But a 
historical approach is here essential. What changed the first causal directions was the  19
fact that intermediary countries are in a different stage of economic growth. When a 
country has still a pre-capitalist economy, or when it is engaged in primitive 
accumulation, there is no other alternative but increasing income concentration. We 
read this in Marx’s classical chapter on primitive accumulation.
40
 Arthur Lewis, in his 
classical “Economic Development with Unlimited Supply of Labor” was absolutely 
clear about the income concentration imperative, but we should remember that he was 
assuming very poor countries, where the rate of savings and investment in relation to 
GDP was around 5 percent. Rostow’s analysis of the “pre-conditions for the take-off” 
stage, which corresponds to Marx’s primitive accumulation, involves also income 
concentration.
41
 Yet, even in this case, the required concentration is in the new 
bourgeois middle class, which will be committed to investment, not in the rich land-




Once primitive accumulation was completed and a capitalist economy is in 
place, the essential is to have macroeconomic stabilization, a more efficient allocation 
of resources, and stronger incentives to work and entrepreneurship. Reduction of 
inequality is more consistent with these goals than its increase. Jeffrey Sachs and 
Andrew Berg for instance, demonstrated that the greater the concentration of income, 
the greater will be foreign indebtedness.
43
 In the same vein, Alesina and Rodrik 
showed that inequality sets higher political demands for distribution, and consequent 
populist policies.
44
  Alice Amsden observes that workers are more motivated and more 




The finding that economic development tends to have an inverted U-shape in 
relation to inequality is well-known since Kuznets’s classical study.
46
 Several 
subsequent studies demonstrated that: Growth of per capita income is initially 
accompanied by rising inequality, but these distortions tend to go away as economic 
development advances. The inverted U-shaped theory, however, should not lead 
policymakers to believe that this is an inevitable and automatic outcome of 
development. In Latin America since industrialization began, and in the developed 
countries in the last quarter of a century, what we see is economic growth with 
increasing inequality – an inequality whose main cause is the acceleration of technical 
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progress, that raises demand for skilled labor and decreases demand for non-skilled 
one.  
If cross-country analyses demonstrate the U-shaped theory, they also show a 
wide variation among countries within each per capita income category. Or, this 
“certainly dispels the notion that the inverted-U is inevitable in the history of each 
country’s development”.
47
 Growth with distribution is rather a policy outcome of a 
progressive tax system, and of state expenditures in education, health, and welfare. For 
sure, it is not of the outcome of regressive flat tax systems, nor from radical 
privatization of the basic social security system,
48
 that official orthodoxy propose and 
some developing countries adopt, although no developed country makes such mistake. 
Distribution promotes growth; growth will only become again consistent with 
distribution when the education systems proved able to supply a higher number of 
skilled people than the demand for them derived from technological change in the 
“new economy”. 
A Political Conclusion 
Summing up, there is a development alternative between official orthodoxy and 
developmental populism for countries in an intermediary stage of economic growth. 
This alternative does not involve the existing quasi-consensuses on what depends 
economic growth. On these matters, there is not a question of alternative, but of 
following the principles involved. The alternative is relevant when there is no 
consensus. I listed five strategic issues where there is no consensus and a progressive 
alternative exists: reforms, balance of payments stabilization, development finance, 
trade, and inequality.  
On reforms, it is not sufficient that they are market-oriented; they must also 
strength the state. On stabilization, controlling budget deficits does not automatically 
entail current account balance, which is crucial for development. On finance, capital is 
made at home, essentially based on domestic savings: the “growth cum debt” strategy 
is a dangerous one; the more dangerous, the less developed the country. On trade, 
there was an inversion of positions between intermediary and developed countries: 
now the ones that are most interested in free trade are the intermediary, not the 
advanced countries, which are increasingly involved in protectionism. On inequality 
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there was also an inversion, but internal to the developing countries: in the first stages 
of growth income concentration in the hands of a new business middle class favored 
growth, now equality-oriented policies are economic development tools. 
Notice that in evaluating development economics and the intermediary 
countries I did not return to the “specificities’ argument”, while this argument was 
usual in big-push and structuralist development economics: the specificities of 
developing countries would require a specific economics. They spoke of cultural and 
social specificities, but actually the relevant difference was between pre-capitalist, pre-
primitive accumulation countries, and capitalist industrial countries. Specificities 
remains relevant today for the poor countries, not anymore for the intermediary ones. 
These economies and society may remain dual, in the sense that social exclusion and 
wealth cohabit, that inequality is often outrageous, but are already fully capitalist: most 
of the market principles that control advanced economies are applicable to them. Celso 
Furtado, recently referring to developing countries’ specificities, distinguished the 
small from the large developing economies. While in small economies, like Chile or 
Costa Rica, integration in global markets is the only alternative, large economies like 
Brazil or India are supposed to use their domestic market as source of growth.
49
 This 
observation indirectly confirms the loss of relevance of the specificities’ argument for 
intermediary countries, as it correctly reduces it to a size argument also valid to 
developed countries. 
In the 1950s a central problem for the underdeveloped or poor countries was to 
industrialize, to “take-off”, in Rostow’s words. Furtado, in his most inspired paper on 
economic development, analyzed the historical process of development since its 
origins in the Italian trade cities till the English industrial revolution. His major 
objective was also to show how, after industrialization, economic development became 
automatic or self-sustained, because industrialists had no alternative but to invest their 
surplus (profits) in order to keep pace with technological progress.
50
 Well, most Latin 
American countries took-off, made their respective industrial revolution, and almost 
immediately after stagnated, while advanced economies continued to grow. Why? The 
answer to this question would require a new paper. The only thing that I may advance 
now is that democratic governance matters. That the conditions for self-sustained 
growth are two, not one.
51
 Besides having achieved industrialization, they must have 
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changed from elites’ democracy (the kind of democracy that characterize intermediary 
economies) to civil society’ democracy (the political regime prevailing in developed 
countries). In elite’s democracy good governance depends on enlightened elites (as in 
authoritarian regimes, it depended on the enlightened monarchs). It is only when civil 
society’s democracy turns dominant, when elites merge in a larger and differentiated 
civil society, and when public opinion formed in public debate becomes the major 
influence in governmental decisions, that good governance stops depending on chance, 
and economic growth becomes indeed self-sustained.
52
 
If what I am saying is true, deepening democracy, creating a public space, 
debating issues not people, using public debate as a learning device from past 
mistakes, turning active and democratic civil society, are tasks that become an 
essential part of an economic development strategy. The quasi-consensus and the 
strategic issues that I discussed in this paper will be permanently debated in this new 
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